Fast IPv6 Network Periphery Discovery and Security Implications


Numerous measurement researches have been performed to discover the IPv4 network security issues by leveraging the fast Internet-wide scanning techniques. However, IPv6 brings the 128-bits address space and renders brute-force network scanning impractical. Although significant efforts have been dedicated to enumerating active IPv6 hosts, limited by technique efficiency and probing accuracy, large-scale empirical measurement studies under the increasing IPv6 networks are infeasible now.
To fill this research gap, by leveraging the extensively adopted IPv6 address allocation strategy, we propose a novel IPv6 network periphery discovery approach. Specifically, XMap, a fast network scanner, is developed to find the periphery, such as a home router. We evaluate it on twelve prominent Internet service providers and harvest 52M active peripheries. Grounded on these found devices, we explore IPv6 network risks of the unintended exposed security services and the flawed traffic routing strategies. First, we demonstrate the unintended exposed security services in IPv6 networks, such as DNS, and HTTP, have become emerging security risks by analyzing 4.7M peripheries. Second, by inspecting the periphery’s packet routing strategies, we present the flawed implementations of IPv6 routing protocol affecting 5.8M router devices. Attackers can exploit this common vulnerability to conduct effective routing loop attacks, inducing DoS to the ISP’s and home routers with an amplification factor of >200. We responsibly disclose those issues to all involved vendors and ASes and discuss mitigation solutions. Our research results indicate that the security community should revisit IPv6 network strategies immediately.



We introduce a novel IPv6 network scanning technique and develop a fast network scanner XMap to evaluate it, harvesting 52M devices. We leverage XMap to measure the unintended exposed IPv6 services and uncover a common IPv6 routing loop vulnerability and receive >131 CNVD/CVE.

CNVD/CNNVD/CVE (109/5/22)

CNVD-2021-03270 CNVD-2021-03271 CNVD-2021-03291 CNVD-2021-03312

CNVD-2021-03318 CNVD-2021-03320 CNVD-2021-03326 CNVD-2021-03327

CNVD-2021-03328 CNVD-2021-03331 CNVD-2021-03375 CNVD-2021-03376

CNVD-2021-03380 CNVD-2021-03399 CNVD-2021-03423 CNVD-2021-03424

CNVD-2021-03425 CNVD-2021-03473 CNVD-2021-03495 CNVD-2021-03503

CNVD-2021-03505 CNVD-2021-03507 CNVD-2021-03508 CNVD-2021-03511

CNVD-2021-04817 CNVD-2021-04818 CNVD-2021-04829 CNVD-2021-04830

CNVD-2021-05370 CNVD-2021-05371 CNVD-2021-05372 CNVD-2021-05373

CNVD-2021-05374 CNVD-2021-05375 CNVD-2021-05380 CNVD-2021-05435

CNVD-2021-05470 CNVD-2021-05472 CNVD-2021-05492 CNVD-2021-05493

CNVD-2021-06623 CNVD-2021-06624 CNVD-2021-06625 CNVD-2021-06626

CNVD-2021-06627 CNVD-2021-06628 CNVD-2021-06629 CNVD-2021-08384

CNVD-2021-08385 CNVD-2021-08386 CNVD-2021-08387 CNVD-2021-08388

CNVD-2021-08389 CNVD-2021-08390 CNVD-2021-08391 CNVD-2021-08394

CNVD-2021-08395 CNVD-2021-10397 CNVD-2021-10398 CNVD-2021-10399

CNVD-2021-10400 CNVD-2021-10401 CNVD-2021-10402 CNVD-2021-10403

CNVD-2021-10404 CNVD-2021-10405 CNVD-2021-10406 CNVD-2021-10407

CNVD-2021-10408 CNVD-2021-10409 CNVD-2021-10410 CNVD-2021-10411

CNVD-2021-10412 CNVD-2021-10413 CNVD-2021-10414 CNVD-2021-10415

CNVD-2021-10416 CNVD-2021-10417 CNVD-2021-10418 CNVD-2021-10419

CNVD-2021-10420 CNVD-2021-10421 CNVD-2021-10422 CNVD-2021-10423

CNVD-2021-10424 CNVD-2021-10425 CNVD-2021-12861 CNVD-2021-12883

CNVD-2021-12886 CNVD-2021-12887 CNVD-2021-12890 CNVD-2021-13250

CNVD-2021-13251 CNVD-2021-13252 CNVD-2021-13253 CNVD-2021-13254

CNVD-2021-13255 CNVD-2021-13256 CNVD-2021-13257 CNVD-2021-13259

CNVD-2021-13260 CNVD-2021-13261 CNVD-2021-13469 CNVD-2021-16327

CNVD-2021-16400 CNVD-2021-29189 CNVD-2021-29190 CNVD-2021-29191


CNNVD-202102-570 CNNVD-202103-1624 CNNVD-202104-652

CNNVD-202104-659 CNNVD-202104-697

CVE-2021-3107 CVE-2021-3108 CVE-2021-3112

CVE-2021-3125 CVE-2021-3128 CVE-2021-3173 CVE-2021-3379

CVE-2021-21727 CVE-2021-22161 CVE-2021-22162 CVE-2021-22163

CVE-2021-22164 CVE-2021-22165 CVE-2021-23238 CVE-2021-23268

CVE-2021-23269 CVE-2021-23270 CVE-2021-23831 CVE-2021-23832

CVE-2021-23833 CVE-2021-23834 CVE-2021-23898

Xiang Li
Xiang Li
Ph.D. Candidate in Cyberspace Security (Tsinghua University)

Xiang Li is a 4th-year Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Network Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University, advised by Professors Qi Li and Haixin Duan. He belongs to the Network and Information Security Lab (NISL). He is a visiting scholar at UC Irvine as a project specialist, working with Professor Zhou Li. He is also working as a security research intern at Qi-An-Xin Technology Company. Additionally, he is the author of the fast IPv6 network device scanner XMap, open-sourced on GitHub. His research interests include network security, protocol security, IPv6 security, DNS security, Internet measurement, and network & protocol fuzzing. As the first author, he has published many research papers at top security conferences like USENIX Security, NDSS, and DSN. As the co-author, he also published multiple papers in top conferences like USENIX Security and SIGMETRICS. He also gets his presentations accepted by top industry security conferences like Black Hat. He likes to attend talks and workshops like IDS, OARC, and VehicleSec to share his research. He has obtained over 140 CVE/CNVD vulnerability numbers for a variety of influential IPv6 and DNS vulnerabilities, which have impacted over 20 home router vendors and all DNS implementations and resolver vendors. He received acknowledgements and more than $10,600 rewards from those vendors, like Google, Microsoft, Cloudflare, and Akamai, and is working for the improvement of DNS protocols (related work has been referenced in RFC).