ICANN DNS 研讨会 | 2021年5月

摘要

In today’s DNS infrastructure, DNS forwarders are devices standing in between DNS clients and recursive resolvers. The devices often serve as ingress servers for DNS clients, and instead of resolving queries, they pass the DNS requests to other servers. Because of the advantages and several use cases, DNS forwarders are widely deployed and queried by Internet users. However, studies have shown that DNS forwarders can be more vulnerable devices in the DNS infrastructure. In this paper, we present a cache poisoning attack targeting DNS forwarders. Through this attack, attackers can inject rogue records of arbitrary victim domain names using a controlled domain, and circumvent widely-deployed cache poisoning defences. By performing tests on popular home router models and DNS software, we find several vulnerable implementations, including those of large vendors (e.g., D-Link, Linksys, dnsmasq and MS DNS). Further, through a nationwide measurement, we estimate the population of Chinese mobile clients which are using vulnerable DNS forwarders. We have been reporting the issue to the affected vendors, and so far have received positive feedback from three of them. Our work further demonstrates that DNS forwarders can be a soft spot in the DNS infrastructure, and calls for attention as well as implementation guidelines from the community.

日期
5月 25, 2021 12:00 PM — 5月 27, 2021 3:45 PM
位置
线上举办

在2021年第四届ICANN的DNS线上研讨会中,我介绍了实验室晓峰师兄所提出了的一种新型DNS缓存污染攻击

李想
李想
清华大学博士研究生(网络空间安全)

李想,清华大学网络科学与网络空间研究院五年级博士研究生,导师为李琦副教授和段海新教授。研究方向为网络与协议安全,已发表论文17篇(含一作6篇:在网络安全四大顶会均有发表、通讯1篇、二作3篇),授权专利1项,在Black Hat多次分享,获得190+CVE等漏洞编号,306+GitHub stars。研究获得多个政府及大学CERT安全公告、60+媒体报道,并被纳入RFC标准文档。其也获得了多项奖项荣誉,如IPv6创新大赛一等奖、GeekCon国际安全极客大赛亚军、王大中奖学金、博士研究生国家奖学金、清华优秀奖学金等。