30th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium | NDSS 2023

Abstract

In this paper, we propose Phoenix Domain, a general and novel attack that allows adversaries to maintain the revoked malicious domain continuously resolvable at scale, which enables an old, mitigated attack, Ghost Domain. Phoenix Domain has two variations and affects all mainstream DNS software and public DNS resolvers overall because it does not violate any DNS specifications and best security practices. The attack is made possible through systematically “reverse engineer” the cache operations of 8 DNS implementations, and new attack surfaces are revealed in the domain name delegation processes. We select 41 well-known public DNS resolvers and prove that all surveyed DNS services are vulnerable to Phoenix Domain, including Google Public DNS and Cloudflare DNS. Extensive measurement studies are performed with 210k stable and distributed DNS recursive resolvers, and results show that even after one month from domain name revocation and cache expiration, more than 25% of recursive resolvers can still resolve it. The proposed attack provides an opportunity for adversaries to evade the security practices of malicious domain take-down. We have reported discovered vulnerabilities to all affected vendors and suggested 6 types of mitigation approaches to them. Until now, 7 DNS software providers and 15 resolver vendors, including BIND, Unbound, Google, and Cloudflare, have confirmed the vulnerabilities, and some of them are implementing and publishing mitigation patches according to our suggestions. In addition, 9 CVE numbers have been assigned. The study calls for standardization to address the issue of how to revoke domain names securely and maintain cache consistency.

Date
Feb 27, 2023 12:00 AM — Mar 3, 2023 11:59 PM
Location
Catamaran Resort Hotel & Spa
3999 Mission Boulevard, San Diego, 92109

In the 2023 30th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, I presented one paper “Ghost Domain Reloaded: Vulnerable Links in Domain Name Delegation and Revocation” and one demo/poster “Demo: Ransom Vehicle through Charging Pile” to the audiences. I met old friend Yue Qin in our group and made many new friends (UCI, IU, UCR, PU, and IMDEA). I also attended the award ceremony and accepted the 1/2 distinguished paper award for our colleagues and friends from Professor Jiahai Yang’s team.

Moments

group
t-shirt
poster
bird
beach
dinner
hiking
award
celebration

Xiang Li
Xiang Li
Ph.D. Candidate in Cyberspace Security (Tsinghua University)

Xiang Li is a 5th-year Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Network Science and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University, advised by Professors Qi Li and Haixin Duan. His research interests include network security, protocol security, IPv6 security, DNS security, Internet measurement, network & protocol fuzzing, network vulnerability discovery & attack, and underground economy with 17 research papers. As the first author, he has published many research papers at all top-tier security conferences, including Oakland S&P, USENIX Security, CCS, NDSS, and Black Hat (Asia, USA, and Europe). He has obtained over 190 CVE/CNVD vulnerability numbers, more than $11,600 rewards, 306+ GitHub stars, multiple CERT reports, 60+ news coverage, and RFC acknowledgement. He got multiple prizes, such as 1st prize of IPv6 Technology Application Innovation Competition, 2nd prize of GeekCon 2023 DAF Contest, National Scholarship, Wang Dazhong Scholarship, and Tsinghua Outstanding Scholarship.